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Abstract
These comments look at the subject from a legal viewpoint, in contrast to the Essay by Pro-
fessor Dr. Gu¨nter Knieps, which uses an economic approach. His Essay raises several issues con-
cerning access: (1) who should be obliged to give it; (2) to whom; (3) in what circumstances; and
(4) on what terms? In practice, the precise answers will depend on whether European Community
(“Community” or “EC”) competition law, national competition law, or national telecommunica-
tions law based on Community directives, are being applied. As far as possible, the same answer
should be given in all cases.
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These comments look at the subject from a legal viewpoint,
in contrast to the Essay by Professor Dr. Gfinter Knieps, which
uses an economic approach. His Essay raises several issues con-
cerning access: (1) who should be obliged to give it; (2) to
whom; (3) in what circumstances; and (4) on what terms?
In practice, the precise answers will depend on whether Eu-
ropean Community ("Community" or "EC") competition law,
national competition law, or national telecommunications law
based on Community directives, are being applied. As far as pos-
sible, the same answer should be given in all cases. In this Essay, I
am not discussing any substantive differences that there may be
between Community competition law and national competition
law.
Although there is no absolute boundary between competi-
tion law and regulation, there are important differences both in
objectives and in methods:' Community competition law is lim-
ited to dealing with restrictive agreements and equivalent ar-
rangements, mergers that create or strengthen dominant posi-
tions, and abuse of dominant positions that have significant an-
ticompetitive, exclusionary, or exploitative effects. Regulatory
regimes may have additional objectives. For example, by encour-
aging the construction of alternative networks, obliging compa-
nies to provide a universal service even in areas in which it is
unprofitable to do so, or for non-economic objectives.
Regulators usually have powers to impose more detailed ob-
ligations, for example, specific prices for defined categories of
services or specific conditions in contracts, than competition au-
thorities would normally impose. Competition authorities may
determine that a price is unfairly high or exploitative, or unfairly
low,2 but they do not normally have the power to fix a precise
* Director, Directorate General for Competition, European Commission; Profes-
sor, Trinity College, Dublin; Senior Visiting Research Fellow, University of Oxford. All
opinions expressed herein are purely personal.
1. See generally John Temple Lang, Community Antitrust Law and National Regulatory
Procedures, in 1997 FoRDHIAm CoRP. L. INST. 279-334 (Barry Hawk ed., 1998).
2. That is, below cost, exclusionary.
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price. Regulators can, therefore, impose new rules on categories
of companies that can be precisely defined, so that there is no
doubt about which companies are bound or precisely what they
are required to do.
Regulators have rule-making powers, which allow them to
change the substantive law. Competition authorities normally
have powers only to make rules, which make clear the practical
effects of already-existing substantive rules of law. Regulators
can deal with problems before they arise by adopting clear new
rules. Regulation is most needed when a newly liberalized mar-
ket is still not competitive. It is needed to determine the rela-
tions between the ex-monopoly and new entrants that are in a
weak position, and to prevent an ex-monopoly that is still domi-
nant from preventing competition from emerging or from tak-
ing excessive advantage of its dominant position. As markets be-
come more competitive, regulation3 becomes less necessary, and
regulation should be reduced. Regulators can require some be-
havior that otherwise would be contrary to Community competi-
tion law. For example, they can require a dominant company to
discriminate in favor of competitors which themselves are invest-
ing in infrastructure, in comparison with others that are not.
In other words, regulatory measures should be taken when
competition law cannot achieve the results that are needed, or
when the results of using competition law would be too uncer-
tain or would take too long to obtain. If competition law can
achieve the desired results, then it should be allowed to do so.
This acceptance is because competition law protects economic
freedom and market mechanisms, and allows parties to negoti-
ate terms corresponding to their view of the value of each agree-
ment. Community competition law' applies only to agreements
and practices that affect trade between European Union Mem-
ber States, directly or indirectly, and to dominant positions in "a
substantial part" of the European Union.
In general, competition law does not require companies to
give their competitors access to their assets, networks, or intellec-
tual property. This situation is the same under both Articles 85
and 86 of the Treaty establishing the European Community
3. As distinct from competition law.
4. As distinct from national competition law.
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("EC Treaty"),' under the "essential facility" principle. This
principle applies only if the refusal to give access has serious an-
ticompetitive effects, if access is essential to enable competitors
to compete,6 and if there is no legitimate business justification
for the refusal.
Even if these conditions are not fulfilled, a regulator may
order the owner of a telecommunications network to intercon-
nect its network with that of a competitor, to provide a more
complete service to the customers of both companies, or to en-
able the competitor to develop its business more quickly without
an insurmountable barrier or a serious handicap. Interconnec-
tion may be ordered by a regulator even if the network owner
does not have a monopoly or dominant market power. In prac-
tice, regulators usually exercise more power than competition
authorities to decide the conditions, including the price, on
which interconnection must be given, and are more likely to or-
der solutions that need supervision or dispute-settlement mecha-
nisms.
The Commission is a competition authority, not a regulatory
authority. Telecommunications regulation is achieved by na-
tional regulatory authorities implementing, among other Com-
munity measures, the Directive on Interconnection.' National
competition authorities apply both Community competition law
and national competition law. The Commission has published a
Notice on the application of Community competition law to tele-
communications access agreements.8 This deals, among other
things, with the relationship between Community competition
law and Community telecommunications legislation.
Under Community competition law, a single company is re-
quired to give access only to an "essential facility" and only if the
company is in a dominant position. If that is so, then there is a
5. Treaty establishing the European Community, Feb. 7., 1992, art. 85, 86, O.J. C
224/1, at 28-29 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. 573, 626-28 [hereinafter EC Treaty], incorpo-
rating changes made by Treaty on European Union ("TEU") amending the Treaty estab-
lishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11 [hereinaf-
ter EEC Treaty], as amended by Single European Act, O.J. L 169/1 (1987), [1987] 2
C.M.L.R. 741 [hereinafter SEA].
6. Because they cannot obtain the goods and services elsewhere and cannot be
expected to build, produce, or invent them for themselves.
7. Council Directive No. -, O.J. L 199/32 (1997); see also Commission Directive
No. 90/388/EEC, O.J. L 192/10, art. 4 (1990).
8. See Commission Notice, O.J. C 265/2 (1998).
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duty to give access to competitors on non-discriminatory terms,
that is, on the terms on which the corresponding operations of
the dominant company obtains access. This duty may make it
necessary to produce separate accounts for the two parts of the
dominant company or to impose a regulatory solution. In some
cases, joint ventures controlling important facilities may have
similar duties imposed on them under Article 85 of the EC
Treaty.9
This principle is "asymmetrical" in the sense that competi-
tion law imposes no duty on non-dominant companies, or on
dominant companies not controlling essential facilities. It is,
however, "symmetrical" in its effects because it puts the activities
of the competitors on the same basis as the corresponding
"downstream" activities of the dominant company owning the es-
sential facility. Professor Knieps's conclusion is that only bottle-
neck facilities should be regulated, whether the owner is the in-
cumbent or a newcomer.1 0 As I understand it, Professor Knieps
uses the word "bottleneck" to mean substantially the same thing
as "essential facility." Therefore, Community competition law is
consistent with his economic principles.
His second conclusion is that local cable-based networks are
likely to be "bottlenecks." This conclusion raises a legal issue. If
there was a serious doubt about whether the locality was "a sub-
stantial part" of the European Union, or whether the refusal to
interconnect affected trade between Member States, then it
would be easier to apply national law-either competition law or
telecommunications law.
Professor Knieps's next point, which is worth discussing, is
his statement that the fact that granting access would reduce the
owner's profit is not a "valid business reason" for refusing access.
This point is of course correct, but terms on which access must
be provided are influenced by the financial consequences for
the monopolist: (a) the monopolist cannot expect to be repaid
its monopoly rents; (b) the monopolist is not required to subsi-
dize its competitor or discriminate in its favor; (c) the monopo-
list may recover its expenditure on providing access and may ob-
9. EC Treaty, supra note 5, art. 85, O.J. C 224/1, at 228 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R_
at 625.
10. In fact, it is unlikely in practice that a newcomer would have control of a bottle-
neck.
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tain a normal return on its invested capital from the competitor;
(d) the monopolist is not required to do anything that is likely to
damage the safety or reliability or efficient use of its facility; and
(e) the interests of third parties, which already have contacts
with the monopolist, must be taken into account. Companies
with "significant market power""a have obligations on network
access, non-discrimination, publication of interconnection con-
ditions, cost-based prices, and cost accounting, under the Inter-
connection Directive, the Voice Telephony, and Leased Lines
Directives.
It is useful to compare dominance under Community com-
petition law and significant market power under the Telecom-
munications Interconnection Directive. "Significant market
power" is: (a) determined by National Regulatory Authorities;
(b) determined in advance and reconsidered at intervals; (c) dis-
putable in national administrative courts; (d) presumed on the
basis of a twenty-five percent share of the "market"-other ele-
ments may be taken into account, for example, excess capacity;
(e) listed and limited in number concerning obligations: to give
access, not to "discriminate," to publish prices, to have "cost-
based" prices, and to keep separate accounts. They can be wider
than duties under competition law. They can, therefore, supple-
ment competition law and make it unnecessary to apply such
law, for example, by requiring separate accounts, or by making it
easier to apply such law, for example, on cross-subsidizing.
There are still unanswered questions about "significant mar-
ket power:" (1) how can it be defined more precisely, and what
tests can be or must be used to measure it; (2) does it apply to
the telecommunications licensee company in a group of compa-
nies or to related companies as well; (3) can the National Regu-
lators look at market shares in markets not mentioned in the
Interconnection Directive; (4) how should market share be mea-
sured: by turnover or number of minutes, by number of sub-
scribers, or by calls terminating in the company's network; (5)
how far is it necessary to harmonize the way National Regulators
apply the rules on significant market power-is it necessary only
to exchange analyses, to save time, or avoid mistakes; (6) for how
long will these rules be needed, and when can they be ended
11. This observation is presumed if a company has more than 25% of market
share.
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and competition law applied without them;1 2 and (7) what does
"cost-based" mean in practice?
It is generally considered that regulation, as distinct from
competition law, is needed primarily during the transitional pe-
riod until liberalized markets become competitive. After that,
they are needed only to provide a technical framework-as Pro-
fessor Knieps says, for allocating frequencies, adopting stan-
dards, and ensuring number portability, and perhaps to ensure
public interest objectives such as universal services.
12. Presumably, this time will be different in each national market.
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